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ABSTRACT 
 International criminal law has long recognised the right of the accused to be 
present at trial as part of his or her right to a fair trial.  However, modern international 
criminal courts and tribunals have recently found that the accused also has a duty to 
be present at trial.  Do both a right to be present and a duty to be present exist and, if 
so, are they compatible under international criminal law?  To answer these questions 
this article will first identify and examine the differences between a right and a duty.  
Next, it will consider the relevant international case law and how the courts and 
tribunals have characterised the presence of the accused.  Finally, it will also consider 
the purposes underlying both the right and the purported duty to be present.  The 
article concludes that international criminal law currently recognises both a right and 
a duty to be present on the part of the accused although one may be incompatible with 
the other.  It also warns that the application of the duty must not be allowed to 
subsume the accused’s exercise of the right, and that the enforcement of the duty must 
be done with due care for the accused’s right to a fair trial. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 It is generally believed that individuals accused of crimes under international 
criminal law have a right to be present at trial.  All of the modern international 
criminal statutes include a section detailing the rights of the accused and each 
includes the right of the accused to be present at trial. However, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the convention on which most of the 
international tribunal statutes are based, does not explicitly refer to a right to be 
present at trial, but rather, describes the accused presence as one of the minimum 
guarantees that must exist to ensure that trial is fair.1 Additionally, the Council of 
Europe has described the presence of the accused at trial as both a right and a duty.2  
Further, both the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International 
Criminal Court have found that the accused has both a right and a duty to be present 
at trial.  Therefore, the question becomes, is the presence of the accused at trial both a 
right and duty and, if so, what are the implications for the accused? 
 It is necessary, as a preliminary matter, to define the terms ‘right’ and ‘duty’.  
Surprisingly, these terms are generally undefined in international law. None of the 
most influential human rights documents, including the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the European 
Convention on Human Rights, define a right or a duty in a general sense. The 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man rather unhelpfully states in its 
                                                        
1 Article 14(3)(d), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (1966) (“Article 14(3)(d)”). 
2 Judgments in Absentia, Council of Europe, Committee of Experts on the Operation of Conventions in 
the European Field (3 March 1998) at 7 (“Council of Europe Report”). 
Preamble that “[w]hile rights exalt individual liberty, duties express the dignity of that 
liberty.”3   Therefore, recourse to more general legal sources is necessary to produce a 
working definition of these terms.  A ‘right’ is “[s]omething that is due to a person by 
just claim, legal guarantee or moral principle” and is defined by the ability of the 
holder of the right to “decide whether to exercise it or not and to bear the 
consequences of that decision.”4 It is also a “recognized and protected interest the 
violation of which is a wrong.”5 By contrast, a duty is a “legal obligation owed or due 
to another and that needs to be satisfied.” 6  A duty is also connected to a 
corresponding right held by another and the person with the duty is bound to do 
perform the described activity.7   
 The definitions of these terms demonstrate the significant difference between 
the two.  A right may be exercised freely while a duty creates an obligation, requiring 
the holder of the duty to act.  Therefore, if the presence of the accused at trial is 
considered a right, the accused may decide to appear for trial of his or her own 
volition and cannot be unilaterally deprived of that choice. If it is considered a duty, 
the accused is required to appear at trial. Failure to comply with a duty can result in 
consequences.  In the context of presence at trial those consequences can include the 
relevant tribunal conducting a trial in absentia against the accused.8  
II. The Right to be Present at Trial 
 Historically, international criminal law did not guarantee the accused’s right to 
                                                        
3 Preamble, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 1948. 
4 B. Garner (ed.), Black’s Law Dictionary, 10th Edition (St. Paul (USA): Thomson Reuters, 2014), 
1517; M. Böse, ‘Harmonizing Procedural Rights Indirectly: The Framework Decision on Trials in 
Absentia’; (2011-2012) 37 North Carolina Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulation 
489, 503. 
5 Garner, (n. 4 above), 1517. 
6 Ibid. at 615. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Niccolò Pons, ‘Some Remarks on in Absentia Proceedings before the Special Tribunal for Lebanon in 
Case of a State’s Failure or Refusal to Hand over the Accused’; (2010) 8 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 1307, 1309.  
be present at trial. Article 12 of the International Military Tribunal Charter, which 
formally established the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, specifically 
permitted proceedings to be conducted against an absent accused if that accused “has 
not been found” or if the Tribunal “for any reason, finds it necessary, in the interests 
of justice, to conduct the hearing in his absence.” 9  The Nuremberg Tribunal 
demonstrated its willingness to proceed in the absence of an accused by allowing 
Martin Bormann to be tried in absentia because of the possibility that he was still 
alive. 10  Bormann was convicted and sentenced to death in his absence.11 
 The International Convention on Civil and Political Rights was the first 
international instrument to address the accused’s presence at trial as a right.  The 
Convention sets out a wide-ranging rights regime impacting numerous areas of life 
including the right to a fair trial.  Article 14(3)(d) of the Convention specifically 
asserts that “[i]n the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall 
be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality: (d) [t]o be tried in 
his presence…”12 This article is significant for multiple reasons.  First, and most 
importantly, it is the genesis of the notion that the accused has a right to be present at 
trial in international criminal law. Second, most of the international criminal courts 
and tribunals modeled the right to be present expressed in their foundational statutes 
on the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights and, in some instances, 
copied Article 14(3)(d) almost verbatim. Finally, there are 168 State Parties and 7 
signatories to the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights making its 
                                                        
9 Article 12, Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 8 August 1945. 
10 International Military Tribunal Preliminary Hearing, Saturday 17 November 1945, Trial of the Major 
War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945 - 1 October 
1946, Vol. 2, (Buffalo: William S. Hein & Co., Inc., 1947), 25. 
11 Office of United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and 
Aggression; Opinion and Judgment; (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 
1947), 166, 190. 
12 Article 14(3)(d), (n. 1 above). 
provisions applicable to the vast majority of the world.13   
 Regional human rights bodies have also codified the accused’s right to be 
present at trial.  In 2007, the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights 
issued its ‘Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance 
in Africa’. Those Principles and Guidelines specifically indicate that a person accused 
of a crime has “the right to be tried in his or her presence.”14  To give effect to that 
right the African Commission has found that the accused “has the right to appear in 
person” before the relevant judicial body and that “the accused may not be tried in 
absentia.”15  If the accused is tried in absentia the accused has the right to petition to 
have the proceedings re-opened on the grounds that there was inadequate notice of 
trial, that notice was not personally served or his or her failure to appear was the result 
of exigent circumstances.16   
 The language used by the African Commission in discussing trials in absentia 
highlights the importance of the accused’s choice to appear at trial. The Guidelines 
and Principles set out three grounds for re-opening proceedings conducted in 
absentia.  All three involve situations in which the accused did not choose to absent 
themselves from trial, but where their failure to appear was outside of their control.  
Trials conducted in the accused’s absence are not strictly forbidden, rather, they are 
only considered illegitimate if they are conducted under circumstances that suggest 
the accused did not actively choose not to be present.  This emphasis on the accused’s 
choice confirms that the African Commission views presence at trial as a right. 
 Two other regional human rights organisations have also addressed the right to 
                                                        
13 Status of Ratification Dashboard, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
http://indicators.ohchr.org (accessed on 15 August 2016). 
14 Section N(6)(c)(i)–(ii), Principles And Guidelines On The Right To A Fair Trial And Legal 
Assistance In Africa, The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, DOC/OS(XXX)247, 
2003.  
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
be present.  The European Convention on Human Rights does not contain a specific 
reference to the right to be present at trial.  However, the European Court of Human 
Rights (“ECtHR” or “European Court”) has found that the accused’s right to be 
present is implicit in the object and purpose of Article 6(1) of the Convention because 
the accused is entitled to take part in a hearing against him or her.17  The European 
Court also specifically referred to the presence of the accused at trial as a right.18  The 
European Court’s conclusion arises out of a belief that “it is difficult to see” how the 
accused could exercise other explicit Convention rights, including “the right “to 
defend himself in person” (Article 6(3)(c)), the right “to examine or have examined 
witnesses” (Article 6(3)(d)) and the right “to have the free assistance of an interpreter 
if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court” (Article 6(3)(e)), without 
being present during trial.19  Based on this holding, even if the right to be present is 
not an enumerated right, it is implicit in the Convention as it makes operative other 
important rights held by the accused, including the overarching right to a fair trial.20  
 The European Court’s decision that a right to be present exists in the European 
Convention also focuses on the accused’s ability to make a choice as to whether he or 
she wishes to participate in proceedings.  Where, the accused has no notion that 
criminal proceedings are being conducted against them, the accused cannot be found 
to have made an effective choice not to participate.21 Absent the ability to make such 
a choice, the accused is entitled to a new determination of the charges.  This indicates 
that an in absentia conviction is only valid if the accused makes an active choice to 
                                                        
17 Colozza v. Italy, (Judgment), App. No. 9024/80 (12 February 1985), paras. 27-28 (“Colozza 
Judgment”). 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. at para. 27. 
20 M. C. Bassiouni, ‘Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice:  Identifying International 
Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions’, (1993) 3 Duke Journal of 
Comparative & International Law 235, 267; Sarah Podmaniczky, ‘Order in the Court: Decorum, 
Rambunctious Defendants, and the Right to be Present at Trial’, 14(5) (2011-2012) University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 1283, 1289.  
21 Colozza Judgment, (n. 17 above), para. 28. 
absent him or herself from court. 
 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights less explicitly endorses the right 
of the accused to be present at trial in the Case of Valle Jaramillo et al. v. Colombia. 
There, the Inter-American Court found “the impunity in this case is reflected by the 
trial and conviction in absentia of members of paramilitary groups, who have 
benefited from the ineffectiveness of the punishment, because the warrants for their 
arrest have not been executed.”22 Interestingly, this decision approaches presence at 
trial from a different direction.  Rather than finding that the accused was deprived of 
an opportunity to effectively exercise their rights, the court determined that the in 
absentia trial was little more than a show trial held so that Colombia would appear to 
be complying with their international obligations under Article 8 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights.23 The trial in absentia actually protected the accused 
because the authorities had no real intention of punishing them for their acts even 
after their conviction.24 It can be extrapolated from the Jaramillo decision that the 
court prefers that trial take place in the presence of the accused, not only to ensure the 
rights of the accused are adequately protected, but also to guarantee that the trial will 
result in a sufficient remedy. 
 When the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY” 
or “Yugoslavia Tribunal”) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(“ICTR” or “Rwanda Tribunal”) (collectively, “the ad hoc tribunals”) were 
established in the early 1990’s, the statutes of both tribunals followed the example of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and indicated that the 
                                                        
22 Case of Valle Jaramillo et al. v. Colombia, Series C No. 192 (Judgment of November 27, 2008), 
para. 165.  
23 Ibid. at para. 168. 
24 Ibid. 
presence of the accused at trial was one of the minimum guarantees of a fair trial.25  
Article 21 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, and Article 20 of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s 
Statute which is modeled on the Statute of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, are both titled 
‘Rights of the Accused’ and both explicitly state that the accused is ‘entitled’ to be 
tried in his or her presence.26  The use of the word entitled suggests the existence of a 
right held by the accused and not a duty to be imposed on the accused. After 
significant debate, it was determined that this minimum guarantee prevented the ad 
hoc tribunals from conducting trials in absentia.27 That interpretation is reinforced by 
the Secretary-General’s statement that the Yugoslavia Tribunal’s Statute reflects the 
fact that trials in absentia are not consistent with the accused’s entitlement to be ‘tried 
in his presence’ as expressed in Article 14 of the International Convention on Civil 
and Political Rights.28 
 Like the Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals, the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court also defines the accused’s presence at trial as a right.  Article 63(1) of 
the Rome Statute unequivocally states that “[t]he accused shall be present during the 
trial.”29  This statement, taken alone, does not indicate whether the accused has a right 
or a duty to be present at trial because it allows for the possibility that the accused’s 
presence can be required rather than resulting from the exercise of a right.  However, 
if the Statute is read as a whole, it becomes evident that the accused has a right to be 
present at trial.  That is because Article 67, much like Article 21 of the Yugoslavia 
Tribunal’s Statute and Article 20 of the Rwanda Tribunal’s Statute, sets out the 
                                                        
25 Article 21(d)(4), Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia; Article 
20(d)(4), Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Counsel Resolution 808 (1993); 
U.N. Doc. S/25704; English Version, 3 May 1993, para. 101 (“Secretary-General’s Report”). 
28 Ibid. 
29 Article 63(1), Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
‘Rights of the Accused’ and identifies presence at trial as one of the entitlements 
contained therein.30   
 This interpretation is supported by the Trial Chamber decisions in Prosecutor 
v. Ruto and Sang and Prosecutor v. Kenyatta.31  In both decisions the Chambers 
determined that defendants at the International Criminal Court have a right to be 
present at trial.32  The Ruto and Sang Court found that “there is no doubt that presence 
at trial is a right for the accused” as expressed by Article 67(1)(d) of the Statute.33  In 
a similar vein, the Kenyatta Court also announced that “[i]t is recognised that the 
presence of the accused during the trial is ... a right” and that the “[p]resence of the 
accused is the default position.”34  The Ruto and Sang Court, citing the Appeals 
Chamber of the Rwanda Tribunal, went on to explain that the purpose of the right to 
be present is to protect the accused from outside interference that might prevent him 
or her from effectively participating in trial.35  Implicit in this finding is that the 
decision to appear lies with the accused, and that it is effective only if it is the product 
of the accused’s own free will.  It further supports the position that presence at trial is 
dependent on the accused’s active choice to participate in proceedings.   
 Even the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s Statute, which famously contains a 
provision permitting trials in absentia, describes the accused as having a right to be 
present at trial.  Article 16(4)(d) of the Special Tribunal’s Statute is modeled on 
Article 14(3)(d) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
                                                        
30 Article 67(1)(d), Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
31 Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joseph Arap Sang, (Public Decision on Mr Ruto's Request 
for Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial) No. ICC-01/09-01/11 (13 June 2013), (“Ruto Trial 
Chamber Decision”); Prosecutor v. Uhuru Mughai Kenyatta, (Public Decision on Defence Request for 
Conditional Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial), No. ICC-01/09-02/11 (18 October 2013) 
(“Kenyatta Trial Chamber Decision”).  
32 Ruto Trial Chamber Decision (n. 31 above), para. 35; Kenyatta Trial Chamber Decision, (n. 31 
above), para. 124. 
33 Ruto Trial Chamber Decision, (n. 31 above), para. 35. 
34 Kenyatta Trial Chamber Decision, (n. 31 above), para. 124. 
35 Ruto Trial Chamber Decision, (n. 31 above), para. 37; citing Nahimana, et al. v. Prosecutor 
(Judgement), No. ICTR-99-52-A (28 November 2007), para. 107 (“Nahimana Judgment”). 
Articles 21 and 20 of the ad hoc Tribunals.  It indicates that one of the minimum 
guarantees of a fair trial is that the accused “be tried in his or her presence.” 36  
However, the Special Tribunal makes the exercise of that right contingent on the 
terms of Article 22, the article that sets out the Tribunal’s trial in absentia regime.  
Although the right to be present at trial at the Special Tribunal is circumscribed by its 
approval of trials in absentia, the Special Tribunal tried to create a system that 
respects both the accused’s right to be present while also allowing trial in the absence 
of the accused. 
 It is debatable whether the Special Tribunal’s trial in absentia regime is truly 
compatible with the accused’s right to be present a trial. Rule 106 of the Special 
Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence, effectuating Article 22(1) of the Statute, 
sets out three situations in which the Special Tribunal may conduct trial in the 
absence of the accused.  They are: (1) the accused has expressly and in writing 
waived his or her right to be present at trial; (2) the accused has not been handed over 
to the Tribunal by State authorities within a reasonable time; or (3) the accused has 
absconded or otherwise cannot be found and all reasonable steps have been taken to 
secure his or her appearance and inform him or her of the charges.37 Unlike other 
courts and tribunals, that only permit trial to proceed in the absence of the accused if 
the accused has made the unequivocal choice not to attend, the Special Tribunal 
allows trials in absentia in situations where there is no clear indication that the 
accused has decided not to be present.  Therefore, although the Special Tribunal may 
explicitly recognise the accused’s right to be present, its unique trial in absentia rules 
imply that the parameters of that right are more circumscribed than in other courts and 
tribunals.   
                                                        
36 Article 16(4)(d), Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. 
37 Rule 106(A), Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Special Tribunal for Lebanon. 
 It is clear that a right to be present at trial exists in international criminal law.  
All of the Statutes governing the conduct of the different international criminal courts 
and tribunals specifically indicate that the accused has the right to be present. 38 
Additionally, many courts and tribunals require clear evidence that the accused chose 
to be absent before trial can be take place in their absence; the ability to choose being 
a hallmark of a right.  Despite the seeming uniformity amongst these various 
foundational documents, different courts have interpreted that right in different ways.  
Some courts, including the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the 
International Criminal Court have also found that in addition to his or her right to be 
present, the accused also has a duty to be present at trial.  
III.  The Duty to be Present at Trial 
 Although it is generally agreed that the accused has a right to be present at 
trial, some international courts have also found a corresponding duty to be present at 
trial.  No international court recognising a duty to be present has done so in isolation; 
it has always been acknowledged together with the accused’s right to be present.  The 
idea that the accused’s presence at trial is both a right and a duty found initial support 
in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. In Poitrimol v. France, 
the European Court found that the presence of the accused at trial gives meaning to 
two important aspects of criminal procedure.  First, it guarantees the accused’s right 
to a hearing, and second, it serves the evidentiary function of allowing the court to 
weigh the accused’s testimony against that of the victims and witnesses. 39   The 
European Court observed that to achieve the second goal the legislature of the country 
in question “must accordingly be able to discourage unjustified absences” and 
                                                        
38 Although not discussed in the text, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Extraordinary Chambers 
in the Courts of Cambodia, The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor and the 
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo all specifically recognised the accused’s 
right to be present at trial. 
39 Poitrimol v. France, (Judgment), App. No. 14032/88, (23 November 1993), para. 35.  
suggests that the accused can be punished for his or her failure to appear (although the 
Court declined to indicate whether ignoring the right to legal assistance was an 
appropriate punishment).40   
 The Poitrimol decision does not explicitly impose a duty on the accused to be 
present but it does make clear that domestic legislatures have the authority to 
implement measures discouraging the accused from refusing to appear at trial. 41 
Permitting governments to sanction an accused person for failing to appear at trial 
implies that the accused has some obligation to appear.  A right, by its very nature, 
may be freely exercised by the right holder. Therefore, the imposition of a penalty on 
the accused for failing to appear suggests the existence of a duty and not a right 
because it infringes on the free exercise of the right. Although the European Court 
does not specify what sanctions are appropriate, it did later find that denying the 
accused the right to counsel if he or she does not appear is not a permissible 
sanction.42 
 The Council of Europe’s Committee of Experts on the Operation of European 
Conventions in the Penal Field (“Committee of Experts”) was one of the first bodies 
to explicitly indicate that the accused had a duty to be present at trial.  In a 
memorandum published in 1998 titled ‘Judgments in Absentia’, the Committee stated 
that criminal defendants had a duty to be present at trial arising out of the requirement 
imposed on the defendant that he or she “give a personal account to the court.”43 The 
Committee of Experts did not offer any further comment on the duty to be present 
other then to acknowledge that linking the duty with an obligation to forgo one’s 
liberty for the duration of trial may not comport with Article 5 of the European 
                                                        
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Van Geyseghem v. Belgium, (Judgment) App. No. 26103/95 (21 January 1999), para. 33. 
43 Council of Europe Report, (n. 2 above), 7. 
Convention on Human Rights.  It also did not attempt to explain how the right to be 
present and the duty to be present interact with one another. 
  Several international courts have also found that the accused has a duty to be 
present at trial. In The Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, the Appeals Chamber of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda found that in order for the accused to 
make a fully knowledgeable waiver of the right to be present, he or she must be 
informed of certain facts including “his/her right to be present at trial” and to “be 
informed that his or her presence is required at trial.”44  This holding indicates that 
there is a dual purpose underlying presence at trial.  However, it also mischaracterizes 
the function of presence before the Rwanda Tribunal. Neither the Tribunal’s Statute, 
nor its Rules of Procedure and Evidence, refer to a duty or requirement on the part of 
the accused to be present at trial.  In fact, the use of the word entitlement in Article 
20(4)(d) indicates that presence at trial is a right and not a duty.  This is a clear 
instance of the Appeals Chamber taking a position that is not based on the relevant 
law and importing it into its findings.  
 In reaching the conclusion that the accused’s presence at trial constitutes both 
a right and a duty, the Rwanda Tribunal Appeals Chamber relied on the Human 
Rights Committee’s Comment in Mbenge v. Zaire.45  The Appeals Chamber asserted 
that Mbenge stood for the proposition that waiver of the right to be present is 
permitted provided that “in the interest of the sound administration of justice, that the 
accused has been informed beforehand of the proceedings against him, as well as of 
the date and place of the trial, and that he has been notified that his attendance is 
required.”46  In fact, the comment relating to Mbenge says no such thing.  Rather, the 
                                                        
44 Nahimana Judgment, (n. 35 above), para. 109. 
45 Mbenge v. Zaire, Communication No. 16/1977 (25 March 1983) (“Mbenge Comment”). 
46 Nahimana Judgment, (n. 35 above), para. 108. 
Human Rights Committee stated in Mbenge that “[j]udgement in absentia requires 
that, notwithstanding the absence of the accused, all due notification has been made to 
inform him of the date and place of his trial and to request his attendance.”47  The 
Appeals Chamber substituted the phrase “to request his attendance” with the phrase 
“notified that his attendance is required.”  This substantively changes the nature of 
presence at trial from a right that can be freely exercised by the accused, to a duty 
required of the accused.  Therefore, not only did the Appeals Chamber read a 
requirement into the Statute and the Rules of Procedure that does not exist, it did so 
on the basis of a faulty interpretation of the relied upon jurisprudence.  The Appeals 
Chamber’s holding may accurately reflect its position as to the issue of presence at 
trial, however, one should be cautious as to the amount weight one gives the 
Barayagwiza opinion. 
 The International Criminal Court also found that the accused has a duty to be 
present at trial in addition to a right to be present.48  In the Ruto and Sang case, Trial 
Chamber V(A) reached that conclusion on the grounds that Article 63(1) must 
describe a duty because the right to be present is already asserted in Article 67.  In the 
view of the Court, finding that Article 63(1) and Article 67 describe the same right 
would mean that there is a redundancy in the Statute.49  The Ruto and Sang Court also 
found support for its position in Article 58 of the Statute which it claims stands for the 
proposition that “the accused’s appearance at trial is an obligation, which can be 
enforced by means of arrest, if not voluntarily undertaken.”50 Although this decision 
was later partially overturned on appeal, the underlying principle that the accused has 
both a right and a duty to be present was not affected by the Appeals Chamber’s 
                                                        
47 Mbenge Comment, (n. 45 above), para. 14.1 (Emphasis added.) 
48 Ruto Trial Chamber Decision, (n. 31 above), para. 42; Kenyatta Trial Chamber Decision, (n. 31 
above), para. 124. 
49 Ruto Trial Chamber Decision, (n. 31 above), para. 39. 
50 Ruto Trial Chamber Decision, (n. 31 above), para. 40. 
decision.  The Kenyatta Court is less clear as to how it reached its conclusion that 
Article 63 contains a duty to be present rather than a right, but it implies that its 
decision is to some extent based on a concern that if the defendant is not obliged to 
appear at trial, the ‘quest for justice’ would be thwarted.51  
 Both the Ruto and Sang and Kenyatta Courts emphasised that the accused’s 
presence at trial is the correct default position and is a reflection of the accused’s duty 
to be present.52  In Ruto and Sang, the Trial Chamber explained this finding by 
connecting the duty to be present to the need for judicial control over the 
proceedings.53  The Court reasoned that for it to assert the necessary judicial control 
during trial it is permitted to require the accused to be present so as to maintain 
jurisdiction over him or her.54  The Court also announced that Article 63(1) provides a 
statutory basis for the Chamber “to make impositions on the time and whereabouts of 
the accused for the purposes of trial” and authorised the Chamber to impose 
“sanctions and forfeitures” on the accused if he or she failed to comply with the duty 
to be present.55 
 The Prosecution appealed the Ruto Trial Chamber Decision on two grounds 
specifically challenging: (1) the scope of the requirement under Article 63(1) that the 
accused be present at trial and the extent to which the Trial Chamber has the power to 
excuse the accused from attendance; and (2) whether the test for excusal established 
by the Trial Chamber is supported by the law.56 The Appeals Chamber declined to 
                                                        
51 Kenyatta Trial Chamber Decision, (n. 31 above), para. 108 
52 Ruto Trial Chamber Decision, (n. 31 above), para. 104; Kenyatta Trial Chamber Decision, (n. 31 
above), para. 124. 
53 Ruto Trial Chamber Decision, (n. 31 above), para. 42. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
56 The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joseph Arap Sang, (Judgment on the appeal of the 
Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber V(a) of 18 June 2013 entitled “Decision on Mr Ruto's 
Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial"), Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11 (25 October 
2013), para. 7 (“Ruto Appeals Chamber Decision”). 
directly address the status of presence at trial as a right and a duty.  Instead, it held 
that:  
part of the rationale for including Article 63(1) in the Statute was to 
reinforce the right of the accused to be present at his or her trial and, in 
particular, to preclude any interpretation of Article 67(1)(d) of the 
Statute that would allow for a finding that the accused had implicitly 
waived his or her right to be present by absconding or failing to appear 
for trial.57 
 
 The Appeals Chamber also held that the Trial Chamber is not prevented from 
using its discretion to excuse an accused from appearing in court, but such an exercise 
of discretion is more limited than the Trial Chamber thought. 58   The Appeals 
Chamber’s explicit recognition that Article 63(1) reinforces the accused’s right to be 
present at trial, without mentioning a corresponding duty to be present at trial, makes 
it reasonable to surmise that the Chamber does not believe that the Statute contains a 
duty to be present. However, its failure to specifically exclude the existence of a duty 
suggests that it is not prepared to rule out the idea entirely; particularly where, as here, 
it was able to reach its conclusion, that the accused could be voluntarily excused from 
trial, without having to rule on the existence of a duty. 
IV. The Contradiction Created by the 
Existence of a Right and a Duty to be Present 
 
 Viewing the accused’s presence at trial as both a right and a duty creates an 
apparent contradiction.  By definition, a right can be freely exercised by the accused, 
whereas the accused is required to perform a duty.  Where a right and a duty overlap, 
the duty is necessarily dominant because it is compulsory.  Put differently, if an 
accused has a right to decide whether or not he wishes to appear at trial, as well as a 
duty requiring his or her appearance, the right is extinguished, as it is optional, in 
favour of the duty, which is obligatory.  If there is a duty to be present at trial, it could 
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be argued that there is no right to be present.  Clearly, that conclusion is not 
sustainable because the Statute of every international court and tribunal asserts that 
such a right exists.  Therefore, the right to be present and the duty to be present must 
encompass different interests.   
 Reference to the text of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights is instructive when determining what the right to be present entails.  The 
International Covenant grants the accused the minimum guarantee to be tried in his 
presence.59 Describing the right to be present as a minimum guarantee implies that at 
a bare minimum the accused must have the opportunity to attend trial if he or she 
wishes.  This interpretation of the right to be present was advanced by the Yugoslavia 
Tribunal’s Trial Chamber in the Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, et al. (“Čelebići Camp 
case”), when the presiding judge, Adolphus Godwin Karibi-Whyte stated of an absent 
defendant “[i]f he wants to be here, he has a right to be here. There is no doubt about 
it.”60  As a result, the right to be present is essentially the right not to be unilaterally 
excluded from trial.61  The existence of the right prevents courts from proceeding in 
the absence of the accused unless the accused waives his or her right to be present and 
the court accepts that waiver.62   
 This construction of the right is also supported by the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights. In Jelcovas v. Lithuania, the Court found that “a 
person charged with a criminal offence should, as a general principle based on the 
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notion of a fair trial, be entitled to be present at the first-instance hearing.” 63  
Although the Jelcovas holding does not explicitly interpret the right to be present at 
trial as securing the accused’s presence if he or she wishes to be present, that 
inference can be drawn if Jelcovas is read together with Stoichkov v. Bulgaria.  There, 
the European Court found that the State has a duty “to guarantee the right of the 
criminal defendant to be present in the courtroom” and also held that it is one of the 
“essential requirements of Article 6”.64 That the State would be required to guarantee 
the right of the accused, that is, not prevent the accused from being present, indicates 
that the accused’s right to be present should be understood as requiring trial to take 
place in his or her presence if he or she wishes to attend.  
 In international criminal law, trial can only legally take place in the absence of 
the accused if the accused is thought to have waived his or her right to be present at 
trial.65  That the accused can choose to waive his or her presence at trial indicates that 
it is a right and not a duty as the accused has control over the decision of whether or 
not to exercise the right. If a person is able to waive his or her presence at trial it 
indicates that he or she is in control of the exercise of the right and not that an 
obligation has been imposed on the accused.66   
 Most international criminal courts permit trial to continue in the absence of the 
accused if the accused waives his or her right to be present. The European Court 
determined that trials conducted in the absence of the accused do not violate the 
European Convention on Human Rights when there has been an explicit waiver of the 
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right to be present.67  It also goes one step further and permits in absentia trials when 
there has been an implicit waiver of the right to be present so long as that implicit 
waiver is unequivocal. 68   Not surprisingly, the question of what constitutes an 
unequivocal implicit waiver has been the subject of much litigation.69   
  The Yugoslavia Tribunal allows trial to continue in the absence of the 
accused following the accused’s waiver of his or her right to be present despite the 
fact that the United Nations’ Secretary-General specifically indicated that trial in 
absentia is incompatible with the Tribunal’s Statute. The Yugoslavia Tribunal 
recognised the defendant’s ability to explicitly waive his right to be present in the 
Čelebići Camp case.  During a discussion about the accused’s right to be present 
Judge Saad Saood Jan stated of the absent defendant “[h]e can waive his right, but 
this is his right, therefore no part of the proceedings can be held in his absence, unless 
he waives his right and authorises [his counsel] to represent him.”70  Similarly, the 
Rwanda Tribunal concluded that the right to be present can be waived by the accused, 
so long as that waiver is made freely, unequivocally and is done “with full 
knowledge.”71 
 The Yugoslavia Tribunal also allows defendants to implicitly waive their right 
to be present. In The Prosecutor v. Mladić, the Trial Chamber made an oral ruling that 
Mr. Mladić’s disruptive behaviour constituted a waiver of his right to be present 
during the testimony of the witness then testifying. 72   The jurisprudence of the 
International Criminal Court supports this position. In the Ruto and Sang case the 
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Appeals Chamber found that in the case of a continuously disruptive defendant “the 
requirement that the accused be present during trial is superseded by the duty of the 
Court to ensure that proceedings are carried out in an orderly manner in the interests 
of the fair and proper administration of justice.” 73   Therefore, “the continuously 
disruptive behaviour of the accused may be construed as an implicit waiver of his or 
her right to be present.”74  
 The European Court explained that the proper administration of justice 
requires that judicial proceedings be conducted with dignity and order.75  In Ananyev 
v. Russia, the European Court determined that “the flagrant disregard by a defendant 
of elementary standards of proper conduct” need not be tolerated by the Court and can 
justify the removal of the defendant from court and the continuation of trial in his or 
her absence on the grounds that his or her behaviour threatened the proper 
administration of justice.76  In such a situation, the defendant’s behaviour can be 
construed as an implicit waiver of his or her right to be present but only if the 
defendant could have reasonably foreseen that trial would continue in his or her 
absence.77  
 Although the international criminal courts that have considered the issue are in 
agreement, it is a dubious conclusion that a disruptive defendant implicitly waives his 
or her right to be present at trial.  These rulings seem to be a way for the court to 
justify its decision to remove the accused from the courtroom on the grounds that the 
removal as the accused’s waiver of his or her right, when in fact, the Court is really 
acting of its own volition. However, the necessary elements required to imply waiver 
of a fundamental right may be lacking under these circumstances.  For the waiver of a 
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fundamental right to be implied, it must be unequivocal.78  An implicit waiver of the 
right to be present is unequivocal when it is determined that the accused 
unambiguously wants trial to continue in his or her absence and that he or she was 
aware that sufficiently disruptive behaviour could result in removal.79  Although it 
demands a case specific inquiry, it is unlikely that every disruptive accused wishes to 
be removed from the courtroom and for trial to continue in his or absence.  In fact, in 
many instances it is probably the opposite; that the accused would like to remain in 
the courtroom so that he or she might continue to interrupt the smooth running of the 
proceedings. 
 It is not as difficult to determine whether the accused is aware that his or her 
actions could result in removal.  The European Court has made clear that a trial court 
has the responsibility of informing a disruptive accused of the consequences of his or 
her actions before ordering him or her out of the courtroom. 80  Therefore, if the 
evidence indicates that the Court carried out that responsibility it can easily be shown 
that the accused was aware of the consequences of continued disruption. This could 
also act as evidence that the accused unequivocally waived his or her right to be 
present. Once an accused is aware that further interference with court proceedings 
could result in removal, it could reasonably argued that continued disruption acts as 
an unequivocal waiver of the right to be present as the accused is making the active 
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decision to continue to disrupt the trial despite knowing it could result in his or her 
removal.         
 Despite international criminal courts and tribunals going to great lengths to 
show that a disruptive accused has waived his or her right to be present at trial, the 
decision of the International Criminal Court’s Appeals Chamber in Ruto and Sang 
raises an interesting question: can courts exclude a disruptive defendant in the 
interests of justice without there being a corresponding waiver of the right to be 
present?  The answer appears to be yes as the proper administration of justice may 
supersede the necessity of ensuring a disruptive accused’s right to be present.  There 
is little precedent supporting this conclusion although a ruling by the Yugoslavia 
Tribunal’s Trial Chamber is instructive.  During the Čelebići Camp case, one of the 
accused, Zdravko Mucić, refused to appear in court and also explicitly refused to 
waive his right to be present.81 The court chose to proceed in Mr. Mucić’s absence 
despite the fact that he had refused to waive his right to be present.  The court 
reasoned that Mr. Mucić’s absence was a tactic to delay trial and that the Trial 
Chamber owed “a moral and legal obligation” to Mr. Mucić, “the country and to the 
universe at large and to all involving the administration of justice” to continue trial in 
his absence.82  The Trial Chamber indicated that Mr. Mucić could not unilaterally 
decide not to attend trial and refuse to waive his right to be present as permitting him 
to do so would be tantamount to a finding that Mr. Mucić had the right to control the 
progress of the proceedings.83  This ruling is enlightening because it allowed the court 
to continue proceedings even when the accused explicitly refused to waive his right to 
be present.  It suggests that while it may be procedurally preferable to find that the 
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accused has either explicitly or implicitly waived his or her right to be present, such a 
waiver is not strictly necessary if the court can justify continuing trial on the grounds 
that to do so would facilitate the proper administration of justice. 
 The proper administration of justice is often cited as one of the key reasons 
why courts should be allowed to proceed in the absence of the accused.  If the right to 
be present prevents the court from conducting proceedings without first affording the 
accused the opportunity to attend if he or she so pleases, then the duty to be present 
requires the presence of the accused at trial in recognition of his or her active role as a 
participant in proceedings and “the wider significance of the presence of the accused 
for the administration of justice.”84 Presence at trial as a duty is seen as a choice to 
respect the “institutions of justice” above the rights of the accused. 85   A key 
determination is whether holding trial in the absence of the accused is in the interests 
of justice.   
 The fear that the interests of justice might be subverted is the main driving 
force behind much of the commentary supporting a finding that the accused’s 
presence at trial is a duty. This argument is rooted in the Human Rights Committee’s 
comment in Mbenge v. Zaire. There the Committee stated that in absentia 
proceedings “are in some circumstances… permissible in the interest of the proper 
administration of justice.”86  A determination as to what is meant by “the proper 
administration of justice” is necessarily a theoretical endeavour as it has no firm 
meaning and an understanding of the issue depends on an individual’s perception of 
what constitutes justice.87   
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 On one side is the assertion that in absentia trials may be conducted under any 
circumstances so long as doing so would be within the “proper administration of 
justice.”88  From that perspective, justice is perceived as righting a wrong committed 
by the accused.  Within this context, the accused is viewed as being “brought” to 
justice for the crimes he or she is alleged to have committed.89  The rationale behind 
this position is that the course of justice must proceed even if the accused refuses to 
participate in the proceedings. 90  This view does not countenance the notion that 
failing to provide the accused with all of the rights he or she is entitled to could also 
lead to injustice because the injustice being addressed is the one the accused is alleged 
to have committed. Rather, presence at trial is plainly understood as a duty rather than 
a right because justice can only be achieved if the accused is present in court and 
available for punishment.  
 The Special Court for Sierra Leone took a similar position.  In The Prosecutor 
v. Issa Hassan Sesay, et al., the Special Court’s Trial Chamber observed that criminal 
law does not allow an absent or disruptive accused “to impede the administration of 
justice or frustrate the ends of justice.”91  This ruling was in response to Defendant, 
Augustine Gbao’s refusal to attend any further hearings because he did not recognise 
the legitimacy of the Special Court.92  To halt trial under these circumstances would 
have been “tantamount to judicial abdication of the principle of legality and a 
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capitulation to a frustration of the ends of justice without justification.” 93   By 
ascribing its position to criminal law generally suggests that the Trial Chamber 
viewed this notion as being a general principle of law. The Court echoed this 
sentiment in The Prosecutor v. Samuel Hinga Norman, et al. when it found that it is 
not “in the interests of justice to allow the Accused’s deliberate absence from the 
courtroom to interrupt the trial” and that any deliberate absence “will certainly 
undermine the integrity of the trial and will not be in the interests of justice.”94   
 Others have taken the contrary position and asserted that ‘the interests of 
justice’ includes respecting the accused’s right to a fair trial. 95   This belief 
encompasses a concern that conducting trials in absentia as punishment for failing to 
appear at trial will result in delegitimizing international tribunals, as doing so will call 
into question any verdicts entered against the accused in those circumstances. 96  
Antonio Cassese recognized that the accused’s failure to appear at trial could prevent 
trials from occurring and “make a mockery of international justice”, but he also 
believed that the “paucity and inconsistency of international rules” regarding trial in 
absentia demonstrated that it was in the interests of justice not to construe presence at 
trial as a duty.97    
  In Prosecutor v. Blăskić, the Appeals Chamber of the Yugoslavia Tribunal 
found that generally speaking conducting a trial in absentia “would not be 
appropriate” even when the accused has waived the right to be tried in his or her 
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presence.98  However, the Appeals Chamber did find that it could conduct in absentia 
proceedings in matters involving the secondary jurisdiction of the tribunal, like 
contempt proceedings, because those matters involved “obstructing the administration 
of justice.”99  The logical interpretation of this holding is that in absentia trials are 
justified when the accused has obstructed the administration of justice.  Because the 
Tribunal found that in absentia trials were not permissible when prosecuting crimes 
under the primary jurisdiction of the court, it follows that the Tribunal does not 
believe that the absence of the accused from trial when accused of primary 
jurisdiction crimes constitutes an obstruction of the administration of justice.  
 There is no clear agreement as to whether the interests of justice are impaired 
if the accused is not present during trial. In the face of such a disagreement, it is 
difficult to impose a duty on the accused to be present since the evidence does not 
wholly support the imposition of that duty.  Therefore, any duty imposed on the 
accused to appear at trial cannot be derived out of a concern that his or her absence 
will undermine the interests of justice, because it is unclear whether the available 
evidence supports such a conclusion.     
 Waivers of the right to be present have also been found in instances not 
involving disruptive defendants. The Appeals Chamber of the Rwanda Tribunal found 
that defendant, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza freely, explicitly and unequivocally waived 
his right to be present at trial by refusing to appear during trial and that the Trial 
Chamber did not err in conducting trial in his absence.100 Following his conviction, 
Mr. Barayagwiza challenged the legality of his trial on the grounds that trials in 
absentia are incompatible with the Tribunal’s Statute and Rules of Procedure and 
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Evidence. 101   The Appeals Chamber denied his appeal and found that trials in 
absentia are permissible if the accused exercises a free, unequivocal and 
knowledgeable waiver of that right.102 This holding conforms to the idea that presence 
at trial is a right.  Here, Mr. Barayagwiza was aware that trial was taking place and 
continued to choose not to attend.   Therefore, his absence was the result of his choice 
not to exercise his right to be present. The defendant’s ability to choose to absent 
himself from trial was later codified in May 2003, when the Tribunal amended its 
Rules and added Rule 82 bis, allowing trials to take place in the absence of the 
accused when the accused chooses to boycott trial.103   
 The International Criminal Court also recognises the importance of the 
accused’s waiver of the right to be present.  In 2013, the International Criminal Court 
changed its Rules of Procedure and Evidence to permit portions of the trial to 
continue in the absence of the accused. Rules 134 bis, 134 ter and 134 quater all 
emphasise the importance of the accused waiving his or her right to be physically 
present in the court before trial can take place in his or her absence.104  Rule 134 bis 
permits the defendant to request that he or she be permitted to appear at “part or 
parts” of his or her trial via video technology.105 Rule 134 ter and Rule 134 quater 
requires that any absence on the part of the accused has to be accompanied by an 
explicit waiver of his or her right to be present at trial.106  By placing the power in the 
hands of the accused to explicitly waive his or her presence at trial, the Assembly of 
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State Parties recognised that trial can only take place absent the accused when the 
accused has specifically authorised that absence.   
 It remains in doubt whether Rules 134 bis, 134 ter and 134 quater are 
compatible with the International Criminal Court’s Statute.  Introduced as a response 
to the litigation surrounding Kenyatta and Ruto’s requests to be absent from trial, the 
permissive waiver regime contained in the new rules permits the accused to absent 
him or herself from much more of the trial than is explicitly allowed by the Statute.107 
It is difficult to see how these new rules comport with the duty to be present as 
proposed by the Ruto Trial Chamber.  Allowing trial to continue in the absence of the 
accused in a greater number of instances than previously permitted does not align 
with the idea that the accused is required to be present at trial. Further, making those 
absences dependent on a waiver by the accused suggests that these types of absences 
are the natural consequence of the accused’s decision not to exercise his or her right 
to be present. It logically follows that if the accused must agree to trial taking place in 
his or her absence then the accused cannot be prevented from attending trial if he or 
she wishes to attend. If there is no consent, i.e. no waiver, trial cannot lawfully occur.  
Therefore, the right to be present must be defined as the right not to be excluded.  
Therefore, if Article 63(1) does contain a duty to be present, these new rules run afoul 
of Article 51(4) of the Statute, requiring amendments to the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence to be “consistent with this Statute”, and Article 51(5), which indicates that 
the Statute will prevail when there is a conflict between the Statute and the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence.108   
                                                        
107 K. Ambos, Treatise on International Criminal Law: Volume III: International Criminal Procedure 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 164. 
108 Articles 51(4) and 51(5), Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
 The accused’s ability to decide whether trial can be conducted in his or her 
absence through the exercise of a waiver may be a strong indicator that the accused 
has a right to be present at trial but it is not conclusive.  Waiver can also indicate a 
duty to be present depending on how that waiver is established.  The Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon opened itself up to criticism by permitting trials in the absence of the 
accused based on a waiver presumed through the non-appearance of the accused 
following notice by publication.109  The Special Tribunal concluded that notice could 
be assumed due to the fact that the efforts undertaken in Lebanon to publicise the 
Tribunal’s first indictment made it “inconceivable that [the four accused] could be 
unaware that they had been indicted”.110  The Special Tribunal’s Trial Chamber took 
this supposition one step further in the Merhi case and found that “[t]he fact that [Mr. 
Merhi] has failed to respond to the charges either in person or through a lawyer leads 
to the conclusion that he has elected not to attend the hearing and has therefore 
waived his right to be present.”111   
  Allowing trial to commence or continue in such a situation falls well short of 
the unequivocal waiver required by most other international courts and tribunals.  
Assuming waiver based on less than conclusive evidence raises significant questions 
as to whether the accused’s absence is the result of an active choice not to attend trial.  
Because there is no clear indication that the accused’s absence is the result of a choice 
not to be present, trials in absentia conducted under these circumstances are best 
viewed as the result of the accused’s failure to comply with the duty to be present. 
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 Waiver implied through silence or inaction indicates a duty to appear couched 
as a failure to exercise the right to appear.  However, failing to exercise a right is 
different from declining to exercise a right.  When an accused waives his or her right 
to be present, either explicitly or implicitly, it must be unequivocal and it is seen as an 
informed decision not to exercise the right to be present.  Failure to exercise a right 
through silence or inaction does not carry with it the same indicia that it was the 
product of an informed decision.  It suggests an obligation because it reverses how the 
right is understood.  Rather than approach trial in the absence of the accused as the 
result of an accused’s decision not to attend, it views trial in absentia as the natural 
result of a failure to act.  In this way, trial in absentia is seen as a legitimate exercise 
of a court’s powers.112 
 When trial in absentia is utilised, it is justified on the grounds that the 
accused’s willful absence from trial constitutes “bad faith conduct” by the accused 
and that such actions should not be allowed to delay or frustrate the smooth progress 
of trial. 113  From that perspective, reflective of the inquisitorial tradition, the 
overriding interest in justice belongs to the public and that the goal of criminal 
prosecution is to arrive at the truth.114  It perceives the defendant’s absence as “halting 
the course of justice” which must be allowed to proceed so the social peace disturbed 
by the criminal offence can be restored.115  It understands justice as something that is 
only available to the victims.  The accused can only thwart justice and not benefit 
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from it.116  The failure of the accused to appear at trial is understood as a disruption to 
the course of justice and by not appearing the accused forfeits his or her right to 
participate in trial.117  
 However, this position comes directly into conflict with the general 
requirement that trial can only proceed following the accused’s unequivocal waiver of 
the right to be present. Understanding trial in absentia as the natural result of a failure 
to act deprives the accused of the ability to exercise his or her waiver of the right to be 
present.  By finding that the accused implicitly waived their right to be present based 
on constructive knowledge, the Special Tribunal took the decision to appear away 
from the accused by assuming their consent to be tried in their absence without any 
positive evidence supporting that conclusion.  This decision does not comport with 
the right to be present as currently constructed in international criminal law.  
V. The Beneficiary of the Duty 
 An additional issue with describing presence as a duty is determining to whom 
the duty is owed.  One suggestion is that the duty is owed to the victims of the alleged 
crimes.  It is thought that the decision not to compel the appearance of the accused, or 
hold trial in the absence of the accused, leaves the victims “without any judicial 
establishment of criminal responsibility.”118 The failure to hold someone accountable 
for the crimes committed is seen as preventing the victims from achieving the sort of 
individual and collective healing needed to allow them to move on with their lives.119 
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Therefore, by construing presence at trial as a duty, and imposing trial in absentia as a 
sanction, it is supposed that any determination of criminal accountability will be 
satisfactory for the victims. The flaw in this argument is that it assumes that an absent 
accused is a guilty accused by equating the absence of the accused with the denial of a 
judicial establishment of criminal responsibility. For this to be the case, the accused 
must be guilty of the crimes alleged.  An innocent, absent accused does not deny the 
victims of anything.  Nor are victims interested in the conviction of any accused.120  
The only way the victims can achieve a true benefit from trial is if the right accused is 
convicted.121 
 The idea that a duty is owed to the victims also relies on the notion that 
victims achieve healing through the conviction of the perpetrators of the crimes 
committed against them. Research suggests that although many people assume that 
trial will promote healing amongst the victims, in fact, it can result in the victim being 
forced to relive traumatic experiences and lead to re-victimisation.122  This danger is 
increased in the context of in absentia trials as an accused convicted in his or her 
absence generally has a right to re-trial once he or she comes under the jurisdiction of 
the relevant court.123   Additionally, it is dubious whether the victims are able to 
overcome their trauma when giving evidence in the absence of the accused. 124 
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Therefore, victims testifying against absent defendants will likely be subjected to at 
least two trials, increasing the possibility for re-victimisation. 
 The victim-oriented argument also fails to take into account the fact that an 
accused convicted in his or her absence means that there will be no one to punish if a 
guilty verdict is returned.125 Victims are frequently dissatisfied with the verdict and 
sentence imposed on the perpetrators of the crimes against them as they generally feel 
that the punishment does not adequately reflect the suffering of the victims.126 It is 
reasonable to assume that victim dissatisfaction would only intensify if there is no 
accused present to serve the sentence imposed. Further, failure to punish responsible 
criminal perpetrators is seen as having a negative effect on the reconciliation 
process.127  Therefore, trials in the absence of the accused may serve the opposite of 
the intended purpose and result in further frustration and discontentment on the part of 
the victims.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
 It is indisputable that the accused has a generally recognized right to be 
present at trial.  However, the recent jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court 
in the Ruto and Sang case indicates that the accused also has a duty to appear at trial.  
This initially suggests a contradiction in the law, however, the right and the duty to be 
present actually relate to different interests and are therefore not in conflict.  The 
accused’s right to be present is better understood as the right not to be excluded from 
trial if the accused wishes to attend.  This does not prevent trial from taking place in 
the absence of the accused as the accused may waive his or her right to be present.  
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 The duty to be present is the recognition of the accused’s active role in 
proceedings and its important place in the proper administration of justice. If the 
accused fails to appear, the court may conduct trial in absentia in recognition of the 
accused’s responsibilities and as punishment for failing to appear. 128   However, 
conducting trial in the absence of the accused as a punishment for his or her failure to 
appear directly conflicts with the fundamental responsibility of a criminal court to 
carry out its duties “with due regard to the rights of the accused.”129  If criminal courts 
are required to function with due regard for the rights of the accused, those same 
courts cannot inflict punishment on the accused if they disagree with the manner in 
which the accused chooses to exercise his or her rights. 
 As a result, although courts have found that the presence of the accused at trial 
is both a right and a duty, courts should be wary of allowing the right to be consumed 
by the duty.  When weighing the decision to proceed in the absence of the accused, 
the court should heed Mirjan Damăska’s concern that de-emphasising the importance 
of defence rights in favour of other interests might result in those rights becoming 
undervalued and lead to the conviction of innocent defendants.130  While the interests 
of the public are important, they must give way if they create a danger of convicting 
innocent defendants. Placing the efficient operation of the justice system ahead of 
defence rights is a slippery slope because an argument can be made that the system 
would function most effectively if the accused had no rights at all.  Once the rights of 
the accused are compromised to a small extent it becomes easier and easier to further 
limit those rights in the interests of a smoothly operating justice system.  Rights must 
not be restricted or impaired in such a way as to compromise the basic purpose of that 
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right.131  If one accepts that the accused has a duty to be present under international 
criminal law, one must also accept that it cannot be applied so as to invalidate any of 
the rights of the accused. 
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